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Abstract 
 
Microfinance is the provision of small amount of loans to those who have low income 
and could not have the access to credit from the formal banks. The study was conducted 
aiming to assess impact of programs in terms of poverty reduction, women`s 
empowerment, timely repayment  and  the livelihood of borrowers of Dedebit Credit and 
Saving Institution(DECSI), using primary data which has been collected through 
structured questionnaire in the study area. Data used for this study were collected as part 
of the MU-IUC collaboration program between Mekelle University and Flemish 
Universities. 
A sample of 183 borrowers was selected randomly for the study. From the total sample 
respondents 71.58% are female and the rest 28.42% are male. Moreover, 108 are female 
headed households and the remaining 51 are male headed households. Therefore, from 
the sample clients female headed households are larger than male headed clients. Only 
clients who took at least two group loans are included in the study as members of the 
treated group. The control group, on the other hand, was made up of DECSI’s clients who 
took only one loan. It was found out in the study that, on average, female headed 
borrowers took significantly lesser amount of loan than their male counterparts. Members 
of the treated group in the sample enjoyed loan frequency ranging from 2-14 and it was 
found that the amount of loan they borrow (loan size) increased from time to time. 
With regard to average profit the amount of profit on average obtained by male 
household headed borrowers is higher than their female household headed counterparts in 
x 
 
all the three loan periods (Current Loan period, Previous Loan period, and Before 
Previous Loan period). 
To measure the impact of microfinance on the living condition of clients we use the 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM). Quasi-experimental samples which contain 
participants and non-participants have been used. We use household consumption 
expenditure as impact indicator. 
 
The analytical findings indicate that microfinance loans of DECSI have improved the 
clients` wellbeing in their living standard. There is a significance difference between 
treated and control groups in terms of food and non-food expenditure which includes 
expenditure on personal care, durables and jewelry. The income of the clients has 
increases due to the fact that beyond their food consumption they possess durable goods 
like household furniture and jewelry such as gold and silver. However, we did not find 
significant difference between program participants and non-participants for total 
expenditure on education, utilities and other expenses like social contributions except that 
in only one method is significant. The increment of income is not only at household level 
but also total per capita of individual household members. 
 
Key Words: microfinance, loan repayment, impact  
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
 
MFIs offer credit to the poor clients through different lending modalities including group-
based lending. Lending is a risky enterprise because repayment of loans can seldom be 
fully guaranteed. The failure of a large number of state sponsored agricultural 
development banks in many developing countries was due, among other things, to their 
inability to ensure good repayment rates among their borrowers (Adams et al., 1984), 
(Yaron ,1994). 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) have been established to provide loan and other services 
to the poor and lower income persons so as to help them alleviate their poverty and 
become self employed by making their business activities. This is in contrast to formal 
banks which provide loans to relatively better off members of the society on the basis of 
collateral. Microfinance can be considered as a development tool that provides financial 
as well as social intermediation including the provision of savings, credit and insurance 
services, while social intermediation involving citizens groups to voice their aspirations 
and raise concerns for consideration by policy makers and develop their self-confidence 
(Robinson, 2002). 
Commercial banks in most developing countries commonly exclude the poor and hard 
core poor from credit facilities because of high transaction cost, their inability to fulfill 
the collateral requirements, their unstable income, and lack of marketable skills as well as 
high monitoring costs. Therefore they are considered as highly risky lending option 
(Prahalad, 2006). 
Commercial banks, savings and loans companies and credit unions always grapple with 
the issue of credit risk because lending serves as the fulcrum around which the wheels of 
their operations revolve. (Adusei,2011). 
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The poor, following their exclusion from the formal banks, usually survive through 
involvement in micro business activities or informal activities that includes small scale 
agriculture, petty trade, small scale industries and others. These activities contribute to 
the employment opportunities and gross domestic product (GDP) of the country. Micro 
and small enterprises (MEs) have been recognized as a major source of employment and 
income in many countries of the third world. Nawai (2010). Unlike the conventional 
financial institutions like the commercial banks, MFIs strive for financial sustainability as 
well as empowerment of the poor women. MFIs usually have the following 
characteristics targeting the poor (especially the poor women), promoting small business 
activities, capacity building for the poor, extending small loans without collaterals, and 
combining credit with savings and charging commercial interest rates (Dejene,1998). 
MFIs provide fund for start-up business or for working capital. In addition, some MFIs 
also provide funds for non business activities such as for education and emergencies 
purpose. In the credit market, agency problem, moral hazard and adverse selection exist 
because of information asymmetries. Information asymmetries are the main obstacle for 
MFIs to provide loans to clients. Financial institutions usually requires business proposal, 
borrower past credit information  to mitigate agency problems, moral hazard and adverse 
selection and to replace the collateral requirement .In group-based lending, borrowers 
must form a group before applying for loans and they also are responsible to other loan 
members. If one member defaults, the others will be denied access for the next loans. 
(Nawai,2010). 
The primary objective of microfinance institutions (MFIs) is to provide financial services 
like (credit & saving) to the poor in order to release financial constraint and help 
alleviating poverty. Each MFI tries to maximize its repayment performance, whether or 
not it is profit oriented. High repayment rates are indeed largely associated with benefits 
both for the MFI and the borrower. They enable the MFI to cut the interest rate it charges 
to the borrowers, thus reducing the financial cost of credit and allowing more borrowers 
to have access to it. DECSI is the microfinance service provider in Tigray region starting 
from 1994. 
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Improving repayment rates might also help reduce the dependence on subsidies of the 
MFI which would improve sustainability. It is also argued that high repayment rates 
reflect the adequacy of MFI`s services to clients` needs. They limit the incidence of cross 
subvention across the borrowers. Last but not least, repayment performance is a key 
variable for donors and international funding agencies on which many MFIs still depend 
for their access to funds (Godquin, 2004).  
As far as the repayment rates are concerned, high repayment rates are mainly associated 
with the advantages both to the MFIs as well as the borrowers. The first best level of 
repayment performance is a perfect (100%) on time repayment rate. If the maximum 
repayment rate the MFI can reach given its lending methodology is lower than the 
targeted 100%, the MFI will use second level strategies including the allocation of larger 
loans to borrowers with lower default probability and attempts to reduce the delay in 
repayment. The MFI will develop incentive mechanisms so as to meet these objectives 
(Godquin, 2004). 
There is a substantial effort which aims lending the poor or credit access as well as 
improving their incentives to meet repayment obligations. One distinguishing feature of 
these efforts has been the formation of borrower group responsibility and peer monitoring 
as the core principles guiding financial transactions (Sharma & Zeller, 1997).      
This paper questions the adequacy of loan allocations like loan size based on the 
comparison of the determinants of the repayment performance to the determinants of the 
loan size. 
 
1.2. Statement of the problem 
 
The spread and success of MFIs in various countries around the world enabled access to 
millions of poor borrowers in different parts of the world. It is well known that formal 
banks, which act as creditors to most entrepreneurial activity in the modern world, have 
largely avoided lending to the poor. Instead, credit to the poor has been provided mostly 
by local moneylenders, often at higher rates.  
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Various approaches have been employed in alleviating poverty; of which provision of 
loan by microfinance institutions is where by the main target is the poor is the basic one. 
Many academics and practitioners agree that allowing the poor to have command over 
resource through credit can contribute towards poverty alleviation. Besides, the allocation 
of credit has an implication both at macro and micro level. There is no doubt about the 
crucial roles of credit on economic development. 
 
The majority of the world's poor live in the Third World countries. Various approaches 
have been employed in alleviating poverty, of which provision of credit where its main 
focus is serving the poor which are participating in various business activities so that they 
will play their own role in alleviating poverty. But credit provision is such a risky 
business that, in addition to other reasons of varied nature, it may involve fraudulent and 
opportunistic behavior. The lender in the formal financial system is at a disadvantage of 
information on the borrower's behavior. Fortunately, group based micro financing system 
that involves peer pressure and joint liability has evolved to counter the problems of a 
conventional bank that provides a collateral based credit alienating the poor (Mengistu, 
1997). The peer pressure on defaulters of the group members may lead to improve their 
repayment rates. Therefore, the members of the group select each other whereby each 
member knows the behavior of the other member properly. Group lending has many 
advantages beginning with mitigation of problems created by adverse selection. The key 
is that group-lending schemes provide incentives for similar types to group together 
Morduch (1999). Peer monitoring and peer pressure inherent in the group lending 
methodology are believed to minimize the problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard associated with information asymmetry and subsequently ensures better 
repayment performance by clients (Zaid, 2008). 
 
In this paper we focus on group lending where by the clients who could not offer 
collateral are required to form small groups and the group members are jointly liable for 
the loan individually as well as jointly and their repayment performance. On top of this, 
we have also focused on poor women clients of microfinance. Women are generally 
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poorer than men so a country`s development strategy that fails to include and directly 
benefit to include women is only a partial strategy because women comprise at least half 
of the population. Enabling poor women to help themselves is a crucial element for the 
attainment of the Millennium Development Goals for poverty reduction. 
 
Research has shown that women invest on health and nutrition of the family as well as 
the children`s schooling hence, benefiting women has an impact on poverty reduction of 
the household. Women are not only better payers of loans, but also better savers than 
men, and more willing to form effective groups to collect savings and decrease the 
delivery costs of many small loans (Mayoux and Hartl, 2009).   
 
In order for MFIs to be successful, they should be sustainable both financially as well as 
institutionally. On top of sustainability one has to include developmental effects like 
income on the target group as core measure of success. For agencies that are involved in 
the development or in assisting the development of a micro-credit institution, it is 
recommended that profitability and sustainability should be the final goals, and therefore 
the only indicators of success (Rudkius, 1994). 
 
Loan default may also deny new applicants access to credit as the bank's cash-flow 
management problems augment in direct proportion to the increasing default problem. 
The problem of loan default reduces the lending capacity of the financial institutions not 
only this it also denies new borrowers from accessing the credit. This disturbs the normal 
inflow and outflow of fund a financial institution has to keep staying in sustainable credit 
market. 
 
Clients borrow money from the MFIs for various purposes like to run their small 
business, purchase of animals, durable equipment and so on. Microfinance is the attempt 
to improve access to small deposits and small loans for poor households which are 
neglected by banks. Therefore, MFIs involve the provision of financial services like loans 
and savings to the poor people who are living in both urban and rural, who are not 
benefited from the formal banks. Therefore, based on all definitions given, it can be 
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concluded that microcredit is just a small credit given to the poor that are engaged in 
microenterprise or for the purpose of income generating activities. MFIs were established 
to fill the gap in the financial services sector by providing funds to the poor and lower 
income group and thus alleviating poverty and enhance their business activities. It is 
generally accepted that credit, which is put to productive use, results in good returns. if 
microcredit is extended based on the financial discipline, borrowers are expected to exert 
more effort so as to benefit from the loan as well as to pay their loans on time (Zaid, 
2008).  
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the timely loan repayment performance of 
Microfinance clients, and analyze if there are significant changes in the borrower`s 
expenditure, women empowerment and their income status. Morduch (2005) reported 
that Grameen Bank shifted their focus from men to women due to repayment problems 
they encountered with the former studies made by Hossain (1988) Khandker et al (1995) 
favoring women. i.e., women are superior to men in terms of loan repayment. Moreover, 
the World Bank (2007) has observed that from past experience repayment is higher 
among female borrowers. Among the reasons is sensitivity of women to peer pressure 
and intervention of loan managers. Why lenders tend their money to women is that they 
are good credit risks, are less likely to misuse the granted loan and share the benefits with 
their family (Adusei, 2011)  
 
Therefore, this research aimed at examining the timely loan repayment performance in 
Mekelle as there was no adequate study previously conducted on both repayment 
performance as well as the benefits of microfinance programs in Mekelle city. 
 
1.3. General and Specific Objectives 
 
The general objective of this paper is whether microfinance clients are paying their loans 
timely and the impact of DECSI`s microfinance services on the clients in Mekelle town. 
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Specific Objectives  
 
1. To investigate the factors influencing the timely loan repayment performance in 
the study area. 
 
2. To assess the benefits of credit to the poor in general and women borrowers in 
particular.  
 
3. To examine whether microfinance has a significant effect on the living condition 
of clients in the study area.  
 
1.4. Research Hypothesis 
 
1. Women borrowers are more trust worthy compared to their male 
counterparts in credit repayment.  
 
2. Microfinance credit has a direct impact on variables like income, food 
expenditures and ensuring women empowerment. Moreover, services 
provided by MFIs are expected to have a positive impact on the society. 
 
1.5. Significance of the Study 
 
The banking sector is reluctant to serve the poor because they are unable to fulfill 
the bank’s lending requirements and banks on the other hand had consider them 
as risky borrowers and involves high administrative costs. Thus, the main issue 
that has to be solved is the loan repayment problem. Therefore the analysis of 
loan repayment performance of microfinance clients would help policy makers to 
formulate appropriate credit policies and programs to alleviate the scarce 
resources to the development of basic sectors of the economy. 
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The findings of the research could also help the financial institute (DECSI) to 
critically evaluate its screening mechanisms and other researchers could make 
further study based on the outcomes of this finding. 
 
1.6. Scope and Limitation of the study 
 
The scope of this paper is on microfinance mainly on credits and its benefits as well as 
loan repayment rates of DECSI`s as indicated in the title. Furthermore, the study is 
limited to one specific area due to time and financial constraint. 
 
This study focuses only on poor women and it excludes the rural areas. It focuses on loan 
repayment performance and the impact of microcredit based on the data obtained. 
 
1.7. Outline of the paper 
 
The thesis has five chapters. Chapter one gives introduction part including background, 
statement of the problem, objective of the study, research hypothesis, significance of the 
study, scope and limitation of the study and organization of the study. The second chapter 
deals with literature review which includes both theoretical and empirical work done. 
Chapter three goes to data and methodology and estimation technique. Results and 
Findings of Descriptive analysis and Empirical Analysis will be presented in chapter 
four.  Conclusion and policy implications will be on the 5th chapter.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Theoretical Literature 
2.1.1. Concepts and Definitions 
 
Microcredit and Microfinance 
Nawai (2010) defined Microcredit as follows. Microcredit or micro lending is defined as 
an extremely small loan granted to the poor so that they will be self employed and 
improve the borrowers` living standards. The loan characteristics are too small, short 
term credit (a year or less), no collateral, required weekly repayment, poor borrower and 
mostly women who are not qualified for a conventional bank loan. Usually the loan pays 
high interest rates because of the high cost in running microcredit program. Microcredit is 
also used as the extension of very small loans to those who are in poverty that designed to 
spur entrepreneurship and help them out from poverty group. These individuals lack 
collateral, steady employment and verifiable credit history, which therefore, cannot even 
meet the most minimal qualifications to gain access to traditional credit. 
The Grameen Bank defined microcredit as small loans given to the poor for undertaking 
self-employment projects that would generate income and enable them to provide for 
themselves and their families. The target population comprising women microenterprises 
from the low income households and the loans have no collateral. 
However Microfinance is defined as the provision of financial services to low income 
clients, including consumers and the self-employed, who traditionally lack access to 
banking and related services (Gonzalez-Vega 2008). Microfinance is a place for the poor 
and near poor clients to get access to a high quality financial service which includes not 
just credit but also savings, insurance and fund transfer. Microfinance, according to Otero 
(1999) is the provision of financial services to low income poor and very poor self-
employed people. These financial services according to Ledgerwood (1999) generally 
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include savings and credit but can also include other financial services such as insurance 
and payment services. 
Microfinance is a development approach that provides financial as well as social 
intermediation. The financial intermediation includes the provision of savings, credit and 
insurance services. While social intermediation involves organizing citizens’` groups to 
voice their aspirations and raise concerns for consideration by policy makers and develop 
their self-confidence (Robinson, 2002). 
Conroy (2002) stated that microfinance is the provision of a broad range of financial 
services such as deposits, loans, payment services, money transfers, and insurance to poor 
and low income households and their MEs. The term evolved from the concepts of 
“microcredit” and “microenterprise” financing, to include the importance of savings as 
well as borrowing. Although the terms are used interchangeably, microfinance represents 
the field as a whole, while the other two terms are more technical and refer only to credit 
provision (Maria, 2004). 
The World Bank defines microfinance as”…small scale financial services- primarily 
credit and savings provided to people who farm or fish and who operate small enterprises 
or microenterprises where goods are produced, recycled, repaired, or sold; who provide 
services; who work for wages or commissions; who gain income from renting out small 
amounts of land, vehicles, draft animals, or machinery and tools; and to other individuals 
and groups at the local levels of developing countries, both rural and urban 
(Robinson,2001). 
Therefore, based on all definitions given, it can be concluded that microcredit is just a 
small credit given to the poor that engaged in microenterprise or for the purpose of 
income generating activities. On the other hand, microfinance encompasses broad 
financial services given to the poor and low-income group for many reasons and not only 
just for income generating activities.  
Credit: is borrowing money today promising for future payment. 
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Loan repayment: paying back the money or debt according to the contractual agreement 
with the lender. 
Default: is the failure to pay a loan according to the schedule at the right time. 
 
2.1.2 The Need for Microfinance Institutions 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) were established to fill the gap in the financial services 
sector by providing funds to the poor and lower income group and thus alleviating 
poverty and enhance their business activities. The MFIs provide funds for start-up 
business or for working capital. In addition, some MFIs also provide funds for non-
business activities such as for education and emergencies purpose. In the credit market, 
agency problem, moral hazard and adverse selection exist because of information 
asymmetries.  Information asymmetries are the main obstacle for MFIs to provide loans 
to clients. Financial institutions usually requires business proposal, borrower past credit 
information and collateral before approving the loan. MFIs offer credit through group-
based lending method to mitigate agency problems, moral hazard and adverse selection 
and to replace the collateral requirement. In group-based lending, borrowers must form a 
group before applying loans and they are also responsible to other group members. If one 
member default, the others will be responsible to pay the loan or they will be denied 
access for the next loans (Nawai, 2010). 
Many of the MFIs started as development support institution, with the vision of 
improving the quality of life of the poor and underprivileged, through intervention in 
various social activities. Their experience in working with the poor helped them in 
offering micro finance services to their clients. Besides from providing credit, some of 
them offered other services like training facilities and marketing arrangement to their 
clients. 
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2.1.3. Repayment Performance in Group Lending 
In group lending borrowers who do not have access to offer collateral to secure the loan 
as well as to minimize adverse selection and moral hazard forming a peer group is a 
possible solution. The members of the group accept to take joint liability for a loan. 
Since group members who participate in the program are formed voluntarily, the 
members have a lot of information about each other. 
Peer selection is the most important mechanism in group lending. If one of the group 
member defaults the other members of the group has to pay the loan because they are 
jointly liable for the loan granted. 
Peer monitoring in group lending peer monitoring increases repayment rates because if 
one of the group member does not repay the loan he/she will be excluded socially by the 
society. 
As Aghion and Goller (2000) stated, in addition to repaying their share of the loan, each 
group member must accept to repay the obligations of their defaulting peers otherwise the 
entire group is denied access to future refinancing. As Van Tassel (1999) has analyzed 
group lending in a similar information environment and has obtained some similar results 
on its effect on the formation of groups and repayment rates. 
Godquin (2004) found in his study that the use of nonfinancial services has a positive 
impact on microfinance repayment performance but that group homogeneity and social 
ties among group members are not always associated with a better repayment 
performance. Individual based lending methods use continuous follow-up, repayment 
incentives, collateral and dynamic incentives (allocation of larger loans overtime to 
borrowers with a group repayment performance), some of which are also used by group 
lending to ensure higher repayment rates. Although with group lending MFIs usually 
used dynamic incentives and nonfinancial services (such as health services, adult literacy 
or training) when they increase the amounts granted to a specific borrower as credit is 
renewed, and condition the allocation of fresh loans to previous repayment behavior. 
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Godquin (2004) studied the explanatory power, social ties, group homogeneity, and the 
dynamic incentives mechanisms on the group repayment performance. He also noted a 
negative effect on the social ties between group members on the repayment. The group 
homogeneity does not affect the repayment performance. MFIs are striving for high 
repayment rates so as to be sustainable in the long run and be independent of subsidy.  
Group lending may not ensure higher repayment rates at all times. When loans are 
received on the basis of joint liability, the risk of loan default by particular member is 
shared by his/her peers. Hence a member may choose to finance a riskier project than 
he/she would when liability is not shared with others. This is because the individual 
borrower may strategically decide to let other members who are keen on securing future 
loans for themselves (Sharma and Zeller, 1997).  
Wydick (1999) in his study in Guatemala reported that the social ties among group 
members have rather a negative impact on repayment rates. He analyzes the effect of peer 
monitoring, social ties, and group pressure on the provision of intra-group insurance, 
mitigation of moral hazard within borrowing groups, and group repayment performance. 
He finds that neither social ties nor group pressure have an effect on repayment rates. 
Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) show how group lending can take advantage of each group 
members information that only borrowers have about each other to draw in relatively 
safer borrowers and thus mitigate the adverse selection problem. Varian(1990) analyzes 
how borrowers mutually monitor each others` projects to ensure the success of financed 
projects while Stiglitz (1990) shows that group lending, via monitoring, alleviates the 
moral hazard issues involved in lending to those with no collateral.  
One of the earliest empirical papers by Wenner (1995) studies group lending as a means 
of transmitting information on borrower creditworthiness. He finds that groups using a 
written internal code of regulations for screening and limited access to alternative credit 
options have a better repayment performance. 
As Ben Soltane Bassem (2008) cited it microfinance institution provided micro credits to 
borrowers who did not reach commercial banks and without requiring collateral. Group 
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lending is an innovation that makes it possible, where the poor borrowers act as 
guaranties each other by join liability. While exploiting the local knowledge that 
members have on each other, group lending solved several problems of information 
asymmetry between borrowers and creditors. 
The findings of empirical studies concerning the determinants of repayment rates in 
group lending are controversial. Khandker et al., (1995) use the registers of Grameen 
bank to extract the determinants of repayment performance; their survey shows that the 
rate of non repayment increases with the period of activity of the branch. They suggest 
that the formation of members that can be associated to non financial services had a 
positive influence on repayment. 
2.1.4. Repayment Performance in Women Borrowers 
 
MFIs enable women borrowers to have an opportunity to control over resources such as 
land, asset, capital, and have access to education, health, nutrition and other services. It 
also empowers women in making decisions both at house hold level and at community 
levels. Microfinance empowers women by putting capital in their hands and allowing 
them to earn an independent income and contribute financially to their households and 
communities. The economic empowerment is expected to generate increased self-esteem, 
respect and other forms of empowerment for women beneficiaries. 
Any review of microfinance is incomplete without a discussion of its impact on women. 
Yunus (2006) stated that 95 percent of the Grameen Bank`s current clients are women. 
Microfinance financial services granted for poor people have been celebrated for its 
ability to reach out to women and enhance their welfare. Morduch (1999) argues that one 
of the main reasons for the success of microfinance is due to the fact that targeting of 
women. 
As Roy Mersland (2009) stated it a number of studies find that women borrowers 
consistently outperform men in terms of their repayment performance. Morduch (2005) 
reported that in its initial stage the Grameen Bank also included men as customers. 
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However, the bank decided to move over with little concentration on women due to 
repayment problems related to male customers. Hossain (1988) reported that in 
Bangladesh 81 percent of women encountered no repayment problems compared to 74 
percent of men. Khandker et al (1995) find that 15.3 percent of Grameen`s male 
borrowers had repayment problems compared to only 1.3 percent of the women. Also 
from Bangladesh, Sharma and Zeller (1997) report that credit groups with higher 
percentage of women had significantly better repayment rates. Finally, in a study from 
Guatemala Kevane and Wydick (2001) report that female borrowers perform better than 
male borrowers. 
On the other hand, a number of studies find that there is no significant relation between 
gender and repayment. In Bangladesh, the analysis made by Godquin (2004) indicates 
that there is a positive correlation between gender and repayment but not significant. The 
work done by Berhanu and Fufa (2008) also leads to a similar conclusion. Finally, the 
most popular MFI found in Indonesia, BRI has never had any specific focus on women 
but still has achieved nearly perfect repayment rates for many years. (Aghion and 
Morduch, 2005, P.139). 
Khandker (2003) finds that a 100 percent increase in the volume of borrowing by a 
women would lead to a 5 percent increase in per capita household nonfood expenditure 
and a 1 percent increase in per capita household food expenditure, while a 100 percent 
increase in borrowing by men would lead to just a 2 percent increase in nonfood 
expenditure and a negligible change in food expenditure. Thus, evidence shows that 
serving women turns out to have stronger impacts on households. Serving women and 
this seems to accord well with the dual objectives of maintaining high repayment rates 
and meeting social goals. 
2.1.5. Group Lending 
As Sengupta and P.Aubuchon (2008) states it, the success of microfinance in generating 
higher repayment rates led many economists to investigate the reasons behind this 
success. The mid-to-late 1990s witnessed that the number of journal articles on group 
lending contracts has increased; economists try to explain how microfinance “succeeded” 
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where traditional forms of lending had failed. Joint liability contracts helped to improve 
repayment rates. MFIs use a variety of lending techniques, such as dynamic and 
progressive loans, frequent repayment schedules, and nontraditional collateral to ensure 
high repayment rates among poor. These mechanisms were either introduced 
independently or in conjunction with joint liability programs such as Grameen`s case. 
 As Lehner (2009) stated it even though individual loans account for a large portion of 
microfinance loans, the literature is heavily biased towards the analysis of group loan 
contracts. Individual lending schems have only very recently attracted the interest of 
researchers. 
In 2006, the Nobel peace prize was awarded to Mohammed Yunus since he found the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh by providing small loans to the extremely poor, the 
Grameen Bank offers these recipients the chance to become entrepreneurs and earn 
sufficiently high income to break themselves free from the cycle of poverty. 
Various theoretical papers have addressed the positive effects of group lending 
mechanisms. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), Ghatak (2000) as well as Van Tassel (1999) 
show that group lending achieves self selection of borrowers and acts as screening 
device. Stiglitz (1990) outlines the role of peer monitoring in group lending schemes, 
which transfers the monitoring role from the financial institution to the borrowers and 
acts as an incentive device. 
Moreover, there are certain drawbacks of group lending. Gine` and Karlan (2006) stated 
that the demand for credit within a group may change overtime, forcing clients with small 
loans to be liable for larger loans of their peers. Furthermore the growth of group lending 
programs may slow down when new borrowers with looser social ties enter and 
consequently, the group lending mechanism loses some of its power. 
Group lending or join liability contract is the most celebrated lending innovation by the 
Grameen Bank. Under this contract members who belong to the group can help mitigate 
the problems encountered to the financial institutions like moral hazard and adverse 
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selection besides, there is a situation where the promise of future credit depends on the 
timely repayment of all group members. 
In group lending programs screening, monitoring and repayment are basically transferred 
from the bank to the group members. Group members have adequate information such as 
asset ownership of the loan applicants, indebtedness and others at a lower cost. They can 
also easily monitor individual efforts made towards ensuring repayment performance. On 
top of this, groups may have also a comparative advantage in enforcement of loan 
repayment. Group members can employ social sanctions Basley and Coate (1995). 
Moreover, group members have a better access to assess the reason for default (Zeller, 
1998).  
2.1.6. Individual Lending 
 
The success of microfinance in generating high repayment rates led many economists to 
investigate the reasons behind this success. The mid-to-late 1990s witnessed a large 
increase in the number of journal articles on group lending contracts, as economists 
sought to explain how microfinance “succeeded” where traditional forms of lending had 
failed. Joint liability contracts were seen as the break from traditional lending 
mechanisms and economic theory was used to readily explain how these contracts helped 
to improve repayment rates. The growth of the literature on group lending contracts in the 
mid-1990s offers the impression that all MFIs operate as such, but the reality is that MFIs 
use a variety of lending techniques, such as dynamic and progressive loans, frequent 
repayment schedules, and nontraditional collateral to ensure high repayment rates among 
poor, underserved borrowers. These mechanisms were either introduced independently or 
in conjunction with joint liability programs such as Grameen’s case (Sengupta and 
Aubuchon, 2008)  
 
Individual lending scheme typically focuses on the crucial role of closely monitoring 
microfinance clients. (Morduch, 2000) point out the importance of monitoring borrowers 
in individual lending programs. Recently researchers have been interested in comparing 
group lending programs to individual lending scheme. Gine and Karland (2006) 
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conducted a field experiment in Philippines. They find out that by offering individual 
loans, a MFI can attract relatively more new clients. Yet, both lending schemes do not 
differ in repayment rates. 
 
As the study made in Philippines (field experiment) stated it, in recent years, however, 
some micro-lenders, such as the Association for Social Advancement (ASA) in 
Bangladesh or the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), have expanded rapidly using individual 
liability loans. Others, like Bancosol in Bolivia and the Grameen Bank, have converted a 
large share of its group liability in to individual liability lending.  
2.1.7. Factors Affecting Repayment Performance 
 
The main factors influencing the loan repayment performance are related to information 
asymmetries, to adverse shocks that affect the borrower or low performance of 
institutions. Information asymmetries arise due to lack of information in relation to 
behavior of the borrower and it is costly to the MFI. Information asymmetries generate 
problems of adverse selection that is granting of loans to borrowers with undesirable 
characteristics like inability to take advantage of the granted loan as well as moral hazard 
that borrowers make little or insufficient effort to take advantage of the loan or use it for 
unproductive purposes. The effect of adverse selection and moral hazard is it increases 
the proportion of borrowers who cannot repay their loans on time. (Godquin, 2004) 
Basley and Coate (1995) argue that the whole group may default, even when some 
members would have repaid under individual liability. This situation happens when the 
number of defaulting borrowers is so large that the remaining members of the group 
cannot afford the repayment of defaulters, along with their own repayment. In this 
situation, borrowers that could repay their loans have little incentive to do so because 
access to future loans will be denied. As a result, they will strategically decide to default. 
According to Nawai (2010), the factors that affect loan repayment performance of MFIs 
can be divided in to four factors namely: 
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 Individual/borrowers factors 
 Firm factors 
 Loan factors and 
 Institutional/lender factors. 
Several studies show that when the loan is not repaid, it may be a result of the borrowers` 
unwillingness and/ or inability to repay. stiglitz and Weiss (1981) recommend that banks 
should screen the borrowers and select the ‘’good’’  borrowers from the ‘’bad’’ 
borrowers and monitor the borrowers to make sure that they use the loans for the 
intended purpose. This is important to make sure that borrowers can pay back their loans. 
a) Individual/borrower characteristics 
Looking at a borrower`s past truck record whether the client is having a clean loan record 
(repaying the loan on time) and economic prospects to determine whether the borrower is 
likely to repay or not. Besides characteristics of the borrowers, collateral requirements, 
capacity or ability to repay and condition of the market should be considered before 
giving loans to borrowers. Gender and educational level also affect the loan repayment 
performance. 
b) Firm characteristics 
Godquin (2004) suggests that the provision of non-financial services such as training, 
basic literacy and health services has a positive impact on borrowers’ repayment 
performance. Roslan and Mohd Zaini, (2009) found that borrowers that did not have any 
training in relation to their business have a higher probability of default.  
According to Tedeschi (2006) there are two possible reasons for default: strategic default 
or default due to a negative economic shock. The lending contract provides incentives to 
discourage strategic default, but default due to an economic shock is unavoidable. In 
contrast, Hulme and Mosley (1996) argue that the important factors contribute to loan 
repayment performance are the design features of the loan. They categorize the designed 
features in to three categories namely access methods, screening methods and incentive 
to pay. Access methods generally ensure that poor people access the loans not the richer 
20 
 
people and the features include maximum loan ceilings and high interest rate. Screening 
methods are used to screen out bad borrowers. 
c) Institutional/lender characteristics 
A few researchers also found that loan characteristics play an important role in 
determining repayment performance Roslan and Mohd Zaini (2009) found that defaults 
generally arise from poor program design or implementation, not from essential problems 
with the borrowers. 
d) Loan characteristics 
According to Derban et al. (2005), causes of non-repayment could be grouped in to three 
main areas: the inherent characteristics of borrowers and their businesses that make it 
unlikely that the loan would be repaid. Second, are the characteristics of lending 
institution and suitability of the loan product to the borrower, which make it unlikely that 
the loan would be rapid? Third, is systematic risk from the external factors such as 
economic, political and business environment in which the borrower operates? Vigenina 
and Kritikos (2004) find that individual lending has three elements namely the demand 
for non-conventional collateral, a screening procedure which combines new with 
traditional elements and dynamic incentives in combination with the termination threat in 
case of default, which ensure high repayment rates up to 100 percent. 
Roslan Abdulhakim et al. (2007) in their study conclude that close and informal 
relationship between MFIs and borrowers may help in monitoring and early detection of 
problems that may arise in non repayment of loans. In addition, cooperation and 
coordination among various agencies that provide additional support to borrowers may 
help them success in their business. 
Nawai (2010) find out that repayment problem is one of the critical issues of MFIs that 
concerns all stakeholders where high loan default rate is the primary cause of the failure 
of MFIs. The agency problem, adverse selection and moral hazard that appear as a result 
of information asymmetries are the main reason why these happened. This is because 
lenders cannot observe the behaviors of their clients whether they are honest or dishonest. 
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The lenders can only observe the outcome of their loans either the clients repay or not. 
Therefore, to mitigate the repayment problems, a close relationship between lender and 
borrower can be applied through monitoring, business advisor and regular meeting. 
Besides that, the lender can introduce reward system to those that paid on time such as 
discount. Moreover, the loan repayment performance can also be influenced by loan size, 
use of loan and repayment period.  
2.1.8 Microfinance in Ethiopia 
 
As the findings that serve as back ground for the development of Sida`s country strategy 
for Ethiopia by Jennefer Sebstad (2003) stated it, a key component of Ethiopia`s 
development strategy is the establishment of sustainable microfinance institutions serving 
large numbers of poor people. While non-governmental organization (NGO) credit 
schemes and informal source of finance have existed in Ethiopia for many years, the 
government instituted a legal and policy frame work for MFIs in 1996 through 
proclamation 40/1996. Since then, 20 MFIs have registered with the National Bank of 
Ethiopia and operate under the auspices of this proclamation.  As at the end of June 2007, 
twenty-seven microfinance institutions operate in the country, obtaining license from 
National Bank of Ethiopia (Befekadu, 2007).  
Like other microfinance approaches found in the world, MFIs in Ethiopia focus on group 
based lending and promote compulsory and voluntary savings. They use joint liability, 
social pressure, and compulsory savings as alternatives to conventional forms of 
collateral. MFIs in Ethiopia provide both agricultural and non-agricultural loans. While 
both loans are provided through group lending methodologies, agricultural loans 
generally require a one-time payment at the end of the loan term. While other loans are 
paid on a weekly or monthly basis. A few MFIs manage remittances for about 100,000 
pensioners each month.   
The objectives of MFIs are quite similar across organizations. They play a role in 
reducing poverty and vulnerability of the poor by increasing agricultural productivity and 
income, diversifying off farm sources of income, and building household assets. They 
achieve these objectives by expanding access to financial services through large and 
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sustainable microfinance institutions. The strategies of MFIs in Ethiopia involve 
community and participatory approaches, encourage the participation of women, promote 
saving mobilization, and emphasize in long-term sustainability. 
The Ethiopian microfinance industry has undergone tremendous growth and development 
in a very short period of time. The credit delivery in Tigray was established as Rural 
Credit Scheme in Tigray (RCST) by local NGO in 1994 and later named as Dedebit 
Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI) in 1997, by introducing the Grameen Bank model 
providing financial services mainly to rural clients in the region (Zaid 2008). As of 
December 2000, DECSI was the fourth largest MFI in Africa, in terms of total number of 
clients (187,470). Amhara Credit and Saving Institution (ACSI) was the sixth largest with 
143,520 clients. Only eight MFIs in Africa had more than 100,000 clients Sebstad (2003). 
DECSI and ACSI take more than 65 percent share in serving clients in the market. 
Similarly, in outstanding loan provision also these institutions take the loan share (62 
percent) in the market (Befekadu, 2007) 
The main suppliers of financial services to the poor in Ethiopia are commercial banks, 
microfinance institutions, credit unions, government projects, NGOs, cooperatives, 
informal, and semiformal, institutions (Wolday, 2000). In Ethiopia formal banks 
(commercial banks and development banks) are not in a position to deliver loan to the 
poor due to high transaction costs for the loans which are very small in size and collateral 
requirements.  According to the study made by Dejene (quoted in Asmelash ,2003) the 
informal finance in Ethiopia accounts for 78 percent and the informal sector consists of 
three indigenous financial institutions, namely Equb(an Ethiopian rotating credit and 
saving associations), Edir (an indigenous insurance scheme), and money lenders.  
2.1.9 Microfinance in Tigray 
 
According to the Booklet prepared by DECSI in 2011, the foundation of DECSI was 
stated as follows.  After years of civil war, drought, and conflict, the Tigray Regional 
State suffered from service hardship during the mid-1990s. According to research on its 
socioeconomic status in 1993, a staggering 89% of the population depends on food aid. In 
this situation the Rural Credit Scheme of Tigray,as one development wing of REST was 
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established in 1994 in order to provide microfinance service to the poor in Tigray region. 
This was later called as a share holding company, Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution 
(DECSI), when microfinance institutions became legal entities in 1997 in Ethiopia. 
DECSI has been working for the impoverished population of Tigray both in urban and 
rural widely for the last 18 years. 
Vision 
The vision of DECSI is to see poverty eradicated not only in Tigray Regional State but 
also in the country through the provision of high quality financial services by establishing 
a competent, strong, efficient, stable and sustainable financial institution our continent. 
 
Mission 
The mission of DECSI is to improve the wellbeing of those individuals operating in the 
areas of subsistence agriculture, micro, small and medium enterprises by increasing their 
income and wealth through provision of quality and sustainable microfinance services. 
Objectives: 
• Improve food security at household level both in the rural and urban areas of the 
region. 
• Create job opportunities for the unemployed parts of the population by promoting 
micro, small and medium enterprises in the region. 
• Stimulate the local economy by offering adequate and efficient financial services 
to the poor. 
• Build financially sound and sustainable institution. 
2.1.9.1. Accomplishments of DECSI 
 
DECSI operates in rural and urban Tigray by giving due attention on the part of society 
who are productive but poor who lucks to finance their business activity like handicraft, 
trade and small scale industry or agricultural productivity. Up to now more than 6 billion 
24 
 
birr loan is disbursed out of which about 4 billion birr is delivered to the agricultural 
sector.  
2.1.9.2. Impact of DECSI in Tigray 
 
The Booklet prepared by DECSI, 2011 indicates that there was an impact assessment 
conducted by twice by a group of researchers from Norway and Ethiopia, so the services 
delivered by DECSI have the following impacts. 
• Has played important role in the increase of agricultural production. 
• Has also played pivotal role in familiarizing and expanding the culture of credit 
and saving services to the community. 
• DECSI clients are able to select new business and markets, and acquainted 
themselves with trading and factory products, food and drinks, carpentry and 
others. 
• Increase financial management and planning skills. 
• Generally in comparing clients with non-clients, clients of DECSI have better 
living standard, greater increase in wealth, positive change in feeding habit, less 
vulnerability to disasters, and better access to health and education services. 
2.2 Empirical Evidence 
 
Several studies have been conducted in developing countries with regard to microcredit 
performance in relation to loan repayment and impact on the poor especially women 
clients. We begin by those who focus on female empowerment. 
2.2.1. Impact of Microfinance in terms of Female Empowerment 
 
Women particularly benefit from microfinance and many microfinance institutions target 
female clients. Microfinance services lead to women’s empowerment by positively 
influencing women’s decision-making power and enhancing their overall socio-economic 
status. By the end of 2006, microfinance services had reached over 79 million of the 
poorest women in the world. As such, microfinance has the potential to make a 
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significant contribution to gender equality and promote sustainable livelihoods and better 
working conditions for women. (Microcredit Summit Campaign Report, 2007) 
 
Seventy percent of the world’s poor are women. Yet traditionally women have been 
disadvantaged in access to credit and other financial services. Commercial banks often 
focus on men and formal businesses, neglecting the women who make up a large and 
growing segment of the informal economy. Microfinance on the other hand often targets 
women, in some cases exclusively. Female clients represent 85 percent of the poorest 
microfinance clients reached. Therefore, targeting women borrowers makes sense from a 
public policy standpoint. The business case for focusing on female clients is substantial, 
as women clients register higher repayment rates. They also contribute larger portions of 
their income to household consumption than their male counterparts. There is thus a 
strong business and public policy case for targeting female borrowers.  
 
Children of women microfinance borrowers also reap the benefits, as there is an 
increased likelihood of full-time school enrolment and lower drop-out rates. Studies show 
that new incomes generated from Microenterprises are often first invested in children’s 
education, particularly benefiting girls. Households of microfinance clients appear to 
have better health practices and nutrition than other households. Positive environmental 
impact is also achievable as microfinance programs may support green jobs and 
renewable energy systems. Microfinance therefore makes a strong contribution to the 
realization of the Millennium Development Goals. 
 
Although the positive impact of microfinance on women’s empowerment is evident, 
microfinance providers must also be cautious to avoid possible negative outcomes. 
Studies have shown that women sometimes have little or no control over their loan, with 
the husband or male family member making all decisions. Moreover, differences in 
literacy, property rights and social attitudes about women may limit impact outside of the 
immediate household. Residents of rural areas specifically continue to have difficulties in 
accessing microfinance. 
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Women may also struggle with the heavier workload created by the responsibility for 
loan repayment. Changes in the access to finance influence the distribution of working 
time between men and women in the same household and between activities yielding 
different returns. Evidence suggests that up to a point microcredit increases the workload 
of women and girls, perhaps offset by more equality in household decision making. 
 
MFI women’s groups should be utilized to promote and strengthen women’s networks 
and not merely as a means of lowering program costs. Women’s groups are useful 
vehicles for non-financial service delivery, such as literacy and health programs. Groups 
also encourage linkages between women and other active community associations and 
the larger civil society network as a whole. (Microcredit Summit Campaign Report, 2007) 
 
Usually the marginalized women among the poor are the primary loan recipients of 
microfinance. Women are the gateway to household security due to the fact that they 
invest more in the well being of their family than the men. This comprises the expenses 
for education, health care, clothing and house hold equipment. They are also best savers 
thus; women are an appropriate target group for alleviating poverty.  
 
Empowerment of women is one of the very important issues in developing countries. As 
women are integral parts of society, their status as well as participation in decision 
making and participating in economic activities is very low. Therefore, microfinance 
plays a vital role in the improvement of decision making by contributing in economic 
activities. 
 
As Sara Noreen (2011) has found out women borrowers contribute to national income of 
the country and maintain a sustainable livelihood of the families and communities 
throughout the world. Women face many socio-cultural attitude, legal barriers, lack of 
education and personal difficulties. Traditionally women have been marginalized and 
they are rarely financially independent as well as more vulnerable members of the 
society. About 70 percent of world`s poor are women but they do not have access to 
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credit and other financial services. Microfinance often target women and it is a critical 
tool to empower women from poor household. 
 
Kabeer (1999) stresses that women`s empowerment is the process to acquire the ability 
from which those who have been denied in the ability to make the strategic life choices. 
Microfinance services lead to women empowerment influence their decision making 
power positively and the overall socioeconomic status.   
 
Although the positive impact of microfinance on women`s empowerment is evident, 
microfinance providers must also be cautious to avoid possible negative outcomes. 
Studies have shown that women sometimes have little or no control over their loan, with 
the husband or male family member making all decisions. Moreover, differences in 
literacy, property rights and social attitudes about women may limit impact outside of the 
immediate household. Residents of rural areas specially continue to have difficulties in 
accessing microfinance. 
 
A majority of microfinance programs target women with the explicit goal of empowering 
them. However, their underlying premises are different. Some argue that women are 
amongst the poorest and the most vulnerable of the underprivileged. Others believe that 
investing in women’s capabilities empowers them to make choices, which is valuable in 
it, and also contributes to greater economic growth and development. Another motivation 
is the evidence from literature that shows that an increase in woman’s resources result in 
higher well-being of the family, especially children. Finally, an increasing number of 
microfinance institutions prefer women members as they believe that they are better and 
more reliable borrowers thereby contributing to their financial viability 
 
In an insightful reflection on the measurement of women’s empowerment, Kabeer (1999) 
explains that women’s empowerment refers to the process by which those who have been 
denied the ability to make strategic life choices acquire such ability. This ability to 
exercise choice incorporates three inter-related dimensions: resources which include 
access to and future claims to both material and social resources; agency which includes 
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the process of decision-making, negotiation, deception and manipulation; and 
achievements that are the well-being outcomes. 
 
Measuring women empowerment by constructing indices is an inappropriate technique as 
it allows the use of arbitrary weights. Most researchers, for instance, will agree that 
impact of a women’s decision to buy cooking oil for the family is different in nature from 
her participation in a decision to buy a piece of land. Both these decisions have different 
implications and magnitude of impact on her empowerment. As such giving equal weight 
to both these decisions does not make sense. At the same time suggesting an arbitrary 
weight for these decisions is also inappropriate, as it is not for the researchers to decide 
the factor by which the latter decision contributes more to women empowerment. 
 
Microfinance can affect women`s empowerment with regard to the use of contraceptives. 
Especially in Bangladesh, microfinance has been promoted as a way to limit the number 
of children, and positive impacts have been found on contraceptive. This means 
microfinance increases the opportunity cost of women`s time. This effect may be 
reinforced by peer pressure as women are urged to reduce family size in order to increase 
education and health expenditure, and to better manage the ability to repay (Aghion and 
Morduch, 2005). When women control decisions regarding credit and saving, they will 
optimize their own and the household`s welfare. 
 
2.2.2. Is Microfinance an Important Tool for Poverty Alleviation? 
 
MFIs supports mainly to clients who participate in the activities often have a low return 
and low market demand and women engaged in informal activities. Even though 
microfinance has been the focus of development and poverty reduction activities for 
decades, development practitioners still know relatively little about the extent of poverty 
reduction possible through microfinance activities (Khandker, 2005). 
 
Moreover, efforts to assess the impact of microfinance programs can be biased by non 
random program placement and participation. Antipoverty programs such as the Grameen 
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Bank are often placed in areas where the incidence of poverty is high. Thus simply 
comparing the incidence of poverty in program and non program areas may lead to the 
mistaken conclusion that microfinance programs have increased poverty. Similarly, those 
who participate may self select in to a program based on unobserved traits such as 
entrepreneurial ability. In that case, simply comparing such outcomes as per capita 
consumption or the incidence of poverty between program participants and 
nonparticipants may lead to the mistaken conclusion that the programs have a high 
impact on poverty reduction, when the effects are due to the unobserved abilities of 
participants. Thus the estimated effects may be under or overestimated depending on the 
type of analysis (Khandker, 2005). 
 
If MFIs successfully serve the poor clients, then those clients should be able to use their 
loans to lift themselves out of poverty. Because of the nature of progressive and dynamic 
loans, successful borrowers earn access to larger loans, helping them break free of 
poverty even faster. 
 
2.2.3. Loan repayment performance 
 
Zeller (1998) findings focuses on the diversification of the joint asset and enterprise 
portfolio among members of the same group, and social cohesion among members, can 
augment the repayment performance in group lending schemes. It also analyses on the 
effects of program design, community and group characteristics on the repayment 
performance of groups, using a data set on groups from six different lending programs in 
Madagascar employing tobit model. The results show that socially cohesive groups pool 
risks by diversifying the members` asset portfolio so that their repayment performance is 
improved even in communities with high risk exposure.  
 
According to Meehan`s findings as (Daba, 2003 quoted it), the impact assessment was 
made on the performance of DECSI. The study was based on both primary and secondary 
data to analyze the impact of the services of the institution. Respondents were asked to 
assess the impact of DECSI`s financial services on their household income then majority 
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of respondents reported a considerable change in their household income, a few of them 
reported relatively modest increases in their household income, few of them said there 
had been no change in their household income. 
 
Several studies have attempted to measure the effect of participation in credit programs 
specifically on food security and nutrition. Sharma and Zeller (1997 ) reported that in 
many countries the poor spend as much as 91 percent of their income on food and also 
that most loans taken, especially in the informal sector, were used for the purpose of 
financing consumption related expenditure. However, when the effect of program 
participation on food security and nutrition was measured, the results were mixed. 
Positive effects were found on household caloric availability in the studies conducted in 
Bangladesh, China and Madagascar. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data Type and Source 
 
Data source for the study were collected from a sample of 183 active members of 
DECSI`s loan groups. Of the total sample, 140 clients took two or more loans and are 
considered as members of the treated group, while the remaining 43 are made up of those 
clients who took only one loan and hence make up the control group. Only clients who 
took at least two loans were included in the sample as members of the treated group to 
ensure that they have completed at least one loan round and stayed active with the MFI 
for some time. Hence, data for this study was gathered from DECSI`s regular loan 
clients. Data used for this study were collected within the framework of the MU-IUC 
collaboration program between Mekelle University and Flemish Universities in Belgium. 
 
3.2. Sampling Technique and Data Collection 
 
Sample clients were selected randomly from the files of two sub-branches found in 
Mekelle which is the capital city of Tigray Region. DECSI has two sub-branch offices in 
Mekelle. In urban areas DECSI`s women group loan clients are larger than those of male 
clients Zaid, (2008). Accordingly, we have in our sample 183 clients (borrowers and non-
borrowers) of which 131 are female and 52 male. 
Data were collected in October/November 2006 by financial support of VLIR with 
collaboration of MU-IUC using a structured questionnaire. Enumerators were given an 
intensive two days training followed by a one day pilot testing in a town different from 
the places where actual data collection was made. 
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With regard to impact evaluation, it involves a comparison of outcomes among treated 
and non-treated groups. There is no problem in identifying those who participate in the 
program (treated), the problem is with those eligible nonparticipants when there are no 
clearly defined and measurable targeting mechanisms. In this study, taking households 
who are not borrowers of DECSI as potential control group members may lead to 
including rich households in to our treatment group while microcredit is for the poor 
ones. On the other hand lack of data on those who are potentially eligible households 
makes it difficult to identify a proper control group. One way of solving this problem as 
recommended by Barnes and Sebstad (2000) is the use of new entrants to the 
microfinance credit programs as control group. Clients who have applied to the MFIs but 
not yet served can be used as potential members of the control group. Therefore 
comparison between new and veteran clients can show the actual impact of microcredit 
on program participants. 
Inclusion of dropouts in the treated group is advisable to obtain realistic estimates 
because the dropouts got better off because of the loans they took from the microfinance 
program, its impact will be captured. Dropouts are also selected randomly from ex-clients 
who dropped out of DECSI for two or more years and the dropouts can again rejoin the 
program and take loans despite the fact that they may not have an outstanding balance 
(Zaid, 2008). 
Observations for both treated and control group have been selected randomly from the 
list of DECSI`s branch office in Mekelle. The treated group also contains the dropouts 
(ex-clients who drop out of DECSI for two or more years) and the control group is 
composed of new entrants who have taken their first loan. Therefore our sample 
comprises three groups of observations: active group loan clients who took at least two 
loans, new group loan clients who took their first loan, and ex-clients who dropped out 
for at least two years. Note that drop outs are considered as members of the treated group. 
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3.3.  The Study Area 
 
Mekelle is one of the largest cities in Ethiopia and capital city of Tigray region and 
selected for the study. Tigray is one of the nine federal states located in the northern part 
of Ethiopia.  
Mekelle city is located in the northern  part of the country at a distance of 780km from 
Addis Abeba having a total population 215,914 of which 104,925 are male and 110,989 
are female (CSA, 2010).  
Mekelle city is located at the foot of a steep cliff, Endayesus escarpment on the east. 
According to Mekelle city Administration annual report (2008), the administrative 
territory of the city is divided in to seven lowest officially and formally recognized units 
like Hawolti, Adi-haki, Kedamay weyane, Hadinet, Ayder, Semien and Quiha. 
The city has expanded tremendously from time to time which emanated from rural-urban 
migration, industry oriented investment, expansion of business and government services. 
Due to the inflow of inhabitants for various purposes, life leading pattern of the society of 
Mekelle typifies 52.3% in trade, 30.7% in service, and the remaining is engaged in 
different skill related activities (BOFED, 2009) 
Mekelle city owns one University (Mekelle University), Mekelle Institute of Technology 
(MIT), and Ten private colleges. 
 
3.4. Microcredit Impact Study 
 
As Judy (2000) indicated impact evaluation is intended to determine whether the program 
had the desired effects on individuals, households, and institutions as well as whether 
these effects are attributed to the program intervention. Impact evaluation can explore 
either positive or negative consequences of a program. 
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Impact evaluation must estimate the counterfactual, that is what would have happened 
had the participation in microfinance never taken place or what otherwise would have 
been true. Therefore to determine the counterfactual, it is implemented by comparison of 
treated or participating in microfinance and control group those who do not participate in 
the program. Control groups are selected from the sample population as the program 
participants. Whereas the comparison is more simply the group that does not receive the 
program under investigation. Both the comparison and control groups should resemble 
the treatment group in every way, the only difference between groups being program 
participation (Judy, 2000) 
. 
When we measure the impact of microcredit for a borrower we should be sure enough 
that the borrower does not borrow from other source so that the result would be reliable 
and could not be over estimated. it is very difficult to separate the borrower`s funds in an 
impact assessment because the funds are mixed if borrowers have already invested the 
money in their business (Hulme, 2000)  
Selection bias and endogeneity of the program placement occurs when the microcredit 
impact study compares a treated group (borrowers) and the control group (non-
borrowers) in order to see whether there is a difference in their living standards between 
the two groups. The objective of this study is to test whether the clients perform better 
than non-clients or vice versa. 
 
This study examines the impact of microcredit loans on borrowers of DECSI uses a 
control group who are found in a similar location, economic and social environment. If 
the researcher fails to meet these criteria, selection bias will occur and the comparison 
among the treated and non-treated would not be fair. In this approach, borrowers were 
asked whether the impact of DECSI`s credit is positive or negative and to what extent is 
positive or negative after they receive the loans. 
In terms of the impact on women`s empowerment the following variables were measured, 
Client`s control over resources, their self-esteem i.e., power and status in their family as 
well as within the community and decision making capacity. The control over resources 
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is measured by examining the women borrower`s influence in making decisions to 
allocate resources with regard to their business activities. In the survey they were asked 
whether they made decisions on their own or on their spouse or partner. In the descriptive 
part the majority of the women borrowers reported that they use the loan they took from 
the microfinance on their own decision. 
 
3.5. Research Methodology 
3.5.1. Analysis Method 
 
For this study, both descriptive using simple statistics and econometric model based on 
propensity score matching approach is used to get the understanding of the data. A 
summary of statistics and tabulation on field data were used to examine the impact of 
DECSI`s intervention on the welfare of participants in microfinance with regard to 
empowerment of women in making decisions with regard to their business activities  and 
on consumption or expenditure. 
 
The analysis includes comparison of expenditure of borrowers and non-borrowers on 
food, education, personal care, utilities, durables and other expenditures.  
 
3.5.1.1. Descriptive Analysis  
 
Descriptive statistics will be used to draw a clear prior understanding of the study. 
Participants and non participants will be compared based on Socio-economic and 
demographic characteristic indicators using a pair T-test for binary categories. To 
understand the difference in outcome between participants, mean difference in outcome 
will also be compared supported by T-test. Moreover, the descriptive statistics includes 
such as mean, frequency, percentage, standard deviation, maximum and minimum. 
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3.5.1.2. Econometrics model  
 
In the econometric analysis, in order to address the second objective  an impact analysis 
with a dependent variable of participation dummy if  treated=1 and control(not-treated)=0 
and outcomes like  income, expenditure and women empowerment will be the dependent 
variables  in the impact evaluation model part  and the explanatory variables will include 
household characteristics (like sex, age and education of household head), Participation 
in micro credit institution is expected to positively affect income generation,  expenditure 
and empowerment.  
 
Impact evaluation is measuring the outcome of the treatment or intervention. Intervention 
refers to adoption of technology, policy changes, training programs, application of 
medicine and others. The outcome to be measured differs from intervention to 
intervention including changes in income or expenditure, empowerment, or poverty 
reduction. 
 
If treatment is randomly assigned, the outcome of untreated individuals can be a good 
estimate of the counterfactual. However, if households that are treated have 
characteristics that differ from the ones that are not treated, comparison of the outcome 
between the two groups will yield biased estimates. According to Judy L. Backer (2000) 
bias arises due to two distinct sources. First it arises due to difference in observables, i.e. 
there may not be common support and second it arises due to unequal distribution of 
observable characteristics within the region of the common support, sometimes called 
selection biased. Addressing this potential problem of bias in general and problem of 
selection bias in particular is a prerequisite to unbiased outcome of an intervention in 
impact evaluation assignment. Then if this is the fact, it is better to apply selection bias 
controlling mechanisms to study the impact of participating in loan credit on income, 
expenditure and empowerment of participants. There are a number of controlling 
mechanisms of selection bias like randomization, propensity score matching, 
instrumental variable estimation, difference in difference. 
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According to Carolyn Heinrich, Alessandiro Maffilo and Gonzalo vzquez (2010), the 
greatest challenge in evaluating any intervention or program is obtaining a credible 
estimate of the counterfactual: what would have happened to participating units if they 
had not participated? Therefore identification of the counter factual is the pillar of a valid 
impact evaluation. In order to assure this situation, this study mainly employs propensity 
score matching (PSM) which helps to randomize the assignment of households to the 
treatment. If comparison groups are statistically identical except the fact that one of them 
received the treatment (credit use) then, the impact of MFI credit can be estimated as the 
mean difference in mean outcomes between groups.  
 
Estimation of the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) using matching methods 
relies on two key assumptions. The first is the Conditional Independence Assumption 
(CIA), which implies that selection into the treatment is solely based on observable 
characteristics (selection on observables). in a randomized program treatment, 
participation and outcome are known to be conditionally independent given control 
variables (Xi`s). Matching on every covariate is difficult to implement when the set of 
covariates is large. To solve this dimensionality problem, we estimate the propensity 
score i.e., the conditional probability [P () = P ( = 1/)] that is the ith individual is 
subjected to the treatment conditional on observed characteristics ( ); where  = 1 is 
when the ith individual is subjected to the treatment, and  = 0 otherwise. The second 
assumption is the common support or overlap condition. The common support is the 
region where the balancing score has positive density for both treatment and comparison 
units.  The matching process is performed in two steps. First, a probit model is regresses 
against observable covariates to estimate the propensity score (probability of participation 
in MFI) , and in the second step, the ATT, conditional on the propensity score is 
estimated using the four matching algorisms such as Nearest Neighbor matching, Radius 
Matching, Kernel Matching, and the Stratification or Interval Matching (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin ,1983).   
Estimation of ATT using PSM involves three basic steps: computing the proponsity 
score, matching on the basis of propensity score and obtaining the treatment effect as a 
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difference of the mean outcomes of participants and non-participants from the matched 
observations. 
 
 =E (=1/	
   + 	 + εi 
Where    is intercept (constant term) 
                 Dummy variable for participation in MFI 
                 Is vector of coefficients of the explanatory variables 
                	  Represents vector of explanatory variables such as household 
characteristics, and institutional factors etc. and                
           εi is the error term 
Denoting participation in MFI by, (where  = 1 indicates treated, and  = 0 indicates 
none treated), Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) for the population can be 
computed as: 
ATT = E ( –  /= 1) .............................................................................. 1   
This is the same as; 
ATT = [E( /= 1) – E(/= 1)] ............................................................. 2 
The sample equivalence is given by: 
ATT =    ∑  –  │    
 ..............................................................3 
This is the same as; 
ATT =    ∑ │    
 –  │=1)] ............................................. 4 
Where; 
│   ) indicates what has happened with participation in MFI (observable) 
│=1) indicates what would have happened without participation in MFI (Non 
observable) 
 
For the robustness of the results, the researcher applied four methods of matching. These 
are Nearest Neighbor matching, Radius Matching, Kernel Matching, and the 
Stratification or Interval Matching. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. Results and Findings 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
4.1.1. Characteristics of Sample Respondents 
 
This section discusses the characteristics of sample borrowers in DECSI and the 
discussion is based on the data collected from the questionnaire. 
At the time of survey there were two weredas in Mekelle and from debub wereda are 70 
female and 32 male a total of 102 borrowers and from semien 61 female and 20 male a 
total of 81 borrowers. 
Table 4.1 Sample Size in the study area by sex 
  Sex of Sample   
wereda Female Male Total 
Debub 70 32 102 
Semien 61 20 81 
Total 131 52 183 
 
A sample of 183 borrowers was selected randomly for the study. From the total sample 
respondents 131(71.58%) are female borrowers and the rest 52(28.42%) are male. From 
the table below we can observe that the proportion of female borrowers is larger than 
male borrowers.  
Table 4.2 Sample by Gender 
Sex     Freq. Percent Cum. 
Female 131 71.58 71.58 
Male 52 28.42 100 
Total 183 100   
 
The mean age of borrowers is around 44.9 years with the minimum and maximum being 
19 and 74 respectively. The mean age for male is 48.7 years which is larger than female 
(43.42) with the minimum and maximum 23 and 74 respectively. The study shows that 
male borrowers are on average older than their female counterparts. 
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         Table 4.3 The average age of the sample by Gender 
Gender mean  min Max sd 
Female 43.41985 19 70 12.24868 
Male 48.71154 23 74 13.33628 
Total                       44.9235 19 74 12.75658 
 
With regard to the borrowers educational background, the number of female borrowers 
75 (57.25%) who could not read and write is larger than their male counterparts 10 
(19.23%). 
Table 4.4 Literacy 
Read & 
Write 
Gender   
Female Male Total 
No 75 10 85 
Yes 56 42 98 
Total 131 52 183 
 
Among the 183 sample respondents, 108 are female headed households and the 
remaining 51 are male headed households therefore, from the sample clients female 
headed households are larger than male headed clients (see Table 4.6). 
 
Table 4.5 Household heads by Gender 
Gender sum mean sd 
Female Headed 108 0.824428 0.381917 
Male Headed 51 0.980769 0.138675 
 
The Table below (4.6) shows that 86% of the clients were trained formally which help 
them to keep their financial records and to run their business in a better way and the 
remaining 14% do not receive training. Capacity building programs aimed at educating 
female borrowers on how to appropriate loans could help improve the repayment 
performance of female clients (Adusei, 2011) 
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Table 4.6 Receiving formal Training 
Receive Training Freq. Cum. 
Yes 86 86 
No 14 100 
Total 100   
 
4.1.2. Loan Characteristics 
 
The mean loan amount is birr 1578.57 with minimum and maximum amount being birr 
200 and 2500 respectively. There were respondents who took loan as 14 times in the loan 
period.  
 
Table 4.7 First loan amount borrowed from DECSI 
Variable Obs min max mean sd 
First Loan 
Amount 140 200 2500 1578.571 780.9592 
 
The study result indicated that borrowers had a range of 1-13 family size that is 
dependent economically or not contributing an income to the households. This implies 
that family heads of households are obliged to support large family members. The mean 
age of female household members is 4.71 and that of male is 5.85 which is higher than 
female, where the National average for family size is 5 members (see Table 4.8).  
 
Table 4.8 Total number of household members by Gender 
gender sum mean sd 
Female 618 4.717557 1.950443 
Male 304 5.846154 2.261221 
Total 922 5.038251 2.100147 
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As shown in Table 4.9 below, on average, female borrowers take smaller loans than their 
male counterparts. i.e., the average loan amount taken by female clients is birr 1412 and 
that of male borrowers is birr 1995. 
Table 4.9 t-test on Average Loan Size by Gender 
Group  Obs    Mean  Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Female  100 1412 77.47636 774.7636 1258.27 1565.73 
Male 40 1995 100.1249 633.2456 1792.478 2197.522 
combined  140 1578.571 66.0031 780.9592 1448.072 1709.071 
Degree of Freedom = 138 
t= -4.23 
p=0.000 
 
       As explained earlier only clients who have taken at least twice are included in the sample. 
We can say that borrowers who have taken more loans from DECSI must have repaid 
their previous loans this is because unless they repay the current loan they will not be 
given the subsequent loan. Moreover, as the clients take more frequently they will gain 
more skill and experience to run and manage their business. The Table below (4.10) 
summarizes the number of loans taken by sample clients. Accordingly, the highest loan 
times are 14 times and the least is twice and the highest frequency is 26 (19%) and the 
lowest is 1(0.72%). 
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Table 4.10 Loan Frequency of the Treated Group 
Loan times Freq. Percent Cum. 
2 26 18.71 23.02 
3 23 16.55 39.57 
4 16 11.51 51.08 
5 14 10.07 61.15 
6 6 4.32 65.47 
7 6 4.32 69.78 
8 12 8.63 78.42 
9 5 3.6 82.01 
10 17 12.23 94.24 
11 3 2.16 96.4 
12 1 0.72 97.12 
13 3 2.16 99.28 
14 1 0.72 100 
Total 139 100   
 
4.1.3. Treated versus Control Sample 
 
From the total respondents 140(76.5%) are treated or borrowers of microfinance and 
43(23.5%) are controlled group. In terms of sex, 100 are treated female and 31 are not 
treated female and the remaining 40 are treated and 12 are non treated male borrowers. 
              Table 4.11 Treated and Control clients of DECSI borrowers. 
  
Gender 
   
Treated Female Male Total 
No 31 12 43 
Yes 100 40 140 
Total 131 52 183 
 
 As Table 4.12 indicates, the mean family size of the participants in microfinance is 5.23 
and that of non-participants is 4.32 which are lower than the treated ones. 
 
44 
 
Table 4.12   Mean family size of treated and control 
Respondents Number Mean family size 
Treated 140 5.23 
Control 43 4.32 
Total 183 4.78 
 
With regard to the literacy among the 140 treated clients 67 of them are illiterate who 
cannot read and write while 73 of them can read and write. Hence majority of the 
participants can read and write. On top of this, among the 43 control group 18 are 
illiterate and 25 are literate. Moreover, among the 183 respondents 85 are illiterate and 
the remaining 98 can read and write so we can say that relatively majority of the sample 
respondents can read and write.  
 
Table 4.13 Literacy of Treated and Control 
  Treatment   
Literacy Control Treated Total 
Illiterate 18 67 85 
Literate 25 73 98 
Total 43 140 183 
 
As mentioned earlier only clients who borrow at least two group loans are included in the 
study. Current loan refers to the recent period where the year the survey was conducted 
(2006) if the loan term was one year, the previous loan is if the term of the loan was two 
years, the before previous loan is the loan taken accordingly. As  can be seen from the 
table below, the average loan taken by sample borrowers, there is a significant difference 
(at 1% level of significant) among Male headed households and female headed 
households i.e., on average female headed borrowers take significantly lesser amount of 
loan than their male counterparts. This may be due to the fact that female borrowers do 
not want to take risks and do not have enough experience to run their business. As can be 
seen in Table 4.14 below the first loan amounts on average birr 1995 for male headed 
households and birr 1412 for female headed households, the current loan is birr 3545.45 
for male headed households and birr 2552.98 for female headed households, in the 
previous loan amount was birr 2787.88 for male headed households and birr 2123.13 and 
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with regard to the before previous loan amount is birr 2662.11 for male headed 
households and birr 1995.64 for female headed households. The total average loan taken 
by male headed households amounts birr 9016.92 and that of female headed households 
is birr 5642.6. There is quite significance difference among them at 1% significance level 
except the before previous loan which is not significant. As can be seen from the Table 
below, the trend indicates that the amount of loan they borrow (loan size) increases from 
time to time therefore we can say that the money they borrow is really utilized by the 
clients. 
The study result indicated that borrowers had a range of 1-13 family size that is 
dependent economically or not contributing an income to the households. This implies 
that family heads of households are obliged to support large family members. The mean 
age of female household members is 4.71 and that of male is 5.85 which is higher than 
female, where the National average for family size is 5 members (see Table 4.14).  
 
          Table 4.14 Average Loan taken by borrowers 
Loan Type MHH FHH t-test 
Obs Avg. Loan Obs Avg. Loan 
First Loan 40 1995 100 1412 0.0000*** 
Current Loan 33 3545.455 67 2552.985 0.0003*** 
Previous Loan 33 2787.879 67 2123.134 0.0015*** 
Before Previous 
Loan 
27 2662.111 55 1995.636 0.1549 
Overall Loan 40 9016.925 100 5642.6 0.0000*** 
        ***= significant at 1% level, MHH=Male Household Head, FHH=Female 
Household Head 
 
The average profit summarizes the profit obtained by sample clients from the business 
activities made within the period where the loan has to be repaid fully, for group loans 
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was 12 months but some loans are delivered for 24 months. Accordingly, the amount of 
profit on average obtained by male headed household borrowers is higher than their 
female household headed counterparts in all the three loan periods (see Table 4.15). As 
mentioned above the average loan size of male borrowers is also higher than that of the 
female borrowers so it is not amusing if their profit is also greater than the female clients 
though this is not always true. There is a significant difference of profit as can be 
observed from the t-test (probability) among the male and female headed families. 
 
  Table 4.15 Average profit of sample respondents 
Loan Type Average Profit 
 
 
 Male headed 
Households 
Female headed 
Households 
t-test 
Current Profit 1461.75 858.76 0.0595* 
Previous Profit 1716.25 980.5 0.0228** 
Before previous Profit 1415.25 822.69 0.0579* 
Overall Profit 4593.25 2661.95 0.240** 
    *=significant at 10% level and **=significant at 5% level 
As Table 4.16 Indicates, in the current loan period only male headed households made a 
loss of (birr 125) and the female headed households made no loss in all the three loan 
periods. 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
          Table 4.16.Average Loss of sample respondents   
Loan Type Average Loss 
 
 
 Male headed 
households 
Female headed 
households 
t-test 
Current Loss 125 0 0.1142 
Previous Loss 0 0 - 
Before previous Loss 0 0 - 
Over all Loss 125 0 0.1142 
 
The most important activities for which borrowers have taken loans were petty trade 
which is (86.43%), handicraft (2.86%), household food consumption (2.14%), agriculture 
like farming, raring of animals (4.29%) and (4.29%) for social affairs like (wedding, 
tsebel, teskar)   The majority of client`s activities imply that the borrowers are business 
oriented. 
 
Table 4.17 Use of the first loan granted to borrowers 
First loan use Freq. Percent Cum. 
petty trade 121 86.43 86.43 
Handicraft 4 2.86 89.29 
Household food consumption 3 2.14 91.43 
Agriculture (farming, animals…) 6 4.29 95.71 
Others 6 4.29 100 
Total 140 100   
 
 
As Table 4.18 indicates, the clients were asked whether the loan amount is enough or not. 
Accordingly, 4(4%) of the sample clients respond the granted loan is more than enough, 
54(54%) of them said good enough, 32(32%) also smaller than required and the rest 10 
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(10%) respond it is very small. Hence, above 50% of the sample clients reported that the 
loan delivered by DECSI is good enough for the business activities they made. 
Table 4.18 Sufficiency of the granted amount (Loan Size) of Borrowers 
Loan size Freq. Cum. 
More than enough 4 4 
Good enough 54 58 
Smaller than required 32 90 
Very small 10 100 
Total 100   
 
       
 Table 4.19 Shows whether the borrowers repay their loans from the benefits they obtain 
from the activities they made. Accordingly, majority of the borrowers i.e., 70% reported 
that they have paid fully from the benefit they get, 18% of them mostly from the benefit 
they get, 11% of them paid some part of it from the benefit they obtained and 1% pay the 
loan from other sources fully. Therefore this implies majority of the borrowers pay their 
loan from the business they make and on time without delay. 
Table 4.19 Loan Repayment with regard to the benefit they obtain 
Is the Repayment from the Benefit Freq. Cum. 
yes, fully 70 70 
yes, mostly 18 88 
yes, some part of it 11 99 
no, i repaid from other sources fully 1 100 
Total 100   
 
As Table 4.20 below indicates 80% of the clients were taking their subsequent loans due 
to the fact that the result obtained from the previous loan/loans was good so that 
believing to do more with the next loan, 14% reported they found their life improving as 
the result of the loan they are taking, 1% responds that the previous loan was not as such 
good but now they want to do more or better on the subsequent loan, 1% reported to help 
their group members or other people, 2% said to have money and use it for other 
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purposes with no specific reason. Therefore majority of the sample clients are taking 
loans repeatedly due to its positive impacts on their income.  
Table 4.20 Incentives for taking the Subsequent Loan 
Reason for Taking the Subsequent Loan Freq. Cum. 
The result from previous loan was good 80 80 
The previous loan was not good  1 81 
I found my life improving 14 95 
To have money and use it for my needs 2 97 
To help my group members or other people 1 98 
No specific reason 2 100 
Total 100   
 
Since the credit delivery mechanism of DECSI is also group based that relies on peer 
monitoring and social sanctions between the group members, respondents were asked 
about their preference towards group loan or individual loan. 23% prefer group loan 
where as 77% prefer individual loan. various theoretical papers addressed the positive 
effects of group lending methodologies like Ghatak & Guinnane (1999) that evidenced 
group lending helps to monitor each member but in this study as can be seen in the table 
4.21 below the majority of the borrowers do not prefer group lending mechanism due to 
the fact that they will be forced to be liable for the loans of their peers. 
Table 4.21 Preference of borrowers towards Group Loan or Individual Loan 
preference Freq. Cum. 
Group Loan 23 23 
Individual Loan 77 100 
Total 100   
 
As can be seen in the Table 4.23 sample respondents were asked about their feeling 
towards group loan therefore 17% reported they hate group loan, 35% respond they do 
not like group loan this may be due to the reason explained in the literature review that 
group members do not like to be liable for the loss made by the group members, 39% 
respond group loan is alright and the remaining 9% indicate they like it very much which 
are few in number. 
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Table 4.22 Response about group loan 
Feeling about group loan Freq. Cum. 
I hate it 17 17 
I do not like it 35 52 
It is alright 39 91 
I like it very much 9 100 
Total 100   
 
 
4.1.4. Credit worthy versus Non-credit worthy Borrowers 
 
Table 4.23 shows whether a member of a group makes a default or repayment problem or 
not. Therefore, according to the descriptive statistics, 11 borrowers make a default of 
which 3 are female and 8 are male but majority of them (88) pay their loan on time  as 
can be shown in the table below where by 63 are female and the rest 25 are male this 
indicates female borrowers make less default than their male counterparts. 
Table 4.23 Loan repayment of Group members 
  
Gender 
    
Default Female Male Total 
Yes 3 8 11 
No 63 25 88 
Total 66 33 99 
 
Table 4.24 Indicates that, 90% of them make some profit and the remaining 10% do not 
make any profit or suffer from loss. 
Table 4.24 Making profit or Loss from the loan 
Description Percent Cum. 
Yes, i made some profit 90 90 
No profit, no loss 10 100 
Total 100   
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Table 4.25 indicates that 2% of sample clients do not repay on time always, 7% do not 
repay timely sometimes and majority of them 90% always repay their loan on time. We 
can conclude from the statistics that majority of the sample borrowers of DECSI repay 
their loans timely according to their contractual agreement. 
Table 4.25 Timely repayment of sample borrowers 
Not repaying on time Freq. Cum. 
yes, always 2 2 
yes, sometimes 7 9 
No, I always repay on time 90 99 
Total 99   
 
Majority of the sample respondents as (Table 4.26) indicates 39(58%) of female 
borrowers and 24(75%) of male borrowers respond that women and men are equally 
good at using their loans (i.e., it may differ from person to person, but it has nothing to do 
with gender), 22(33%) of female clients and 2(6%) of male borrowers believe that 
women are much better in utilizing their loans more effectively compared to men, 5(7%) 
of women borrowers and 5(16%) of male borrowers reported that men are much better in 
utilizing their loans more effectively compared to women, and the rest 1(1%) of female 
clients and 1( 3%) of male clients suggest that women are slightly better in utilizing their 
loans more effectively compared to men. 
4.1.5. Credit versus Women 
Table 4.26 Response of clients who makes better use of loans 
effectively: Men or Women? 
Response 
Observations 
Female Male Total 
Women are much better  in Utilizing their loans more 
effectively  compared to  men 22 2 24 
Men are much better in Utilizing their loans more 
effectively compared  to   women 5 5 10 
Women are slightly better in Utilizing their loans more 
effectively compared  to  men 1 1 2 
Women and men are equally good at using their loans (i.e., 
it may differ from person to person, but it has nothing to do 
with gender) 39 24 63 
Total 67 32 99 
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Studies suggest that many microfinance programs have attained their objectives by 
reaching a large number of clients with small amounts of resources. Women are believed 
to be the main participants and beneficiaries of microfinance programs in many countries. 
Yet, many women lack enough power within households to use their loans to improve 
productivity and welfare Goetz and Gupta (1996). In this study, 25(35%) of the female 
borrowers have spouse where as 47(65%) do not have a partner (see Table 4.27) 
Table 4.27 Sample clients having a husband/ partner 
Response Freq. Percent Cum. 
Yes 25 34.72 34.72 
No 47 65.28 100 
Total 72 100 
 
 
As shown in Table 4.28 below, 85% of the borrowers reported that they do not give the 
loan they borrowed from DECSI to their husbands they use it for themselves and 7.41% 
reported that they give it all or part of it to their partner. As Sara Noreen (2011) has stated 
it women will be empowered when they will have full control over their own life. 
 
Table 4.28 If borrowers use the credit for themselves or for their husband. 
Description Freq. Percent Cum. 
Yes, I give it all to my husband 2 7.41 7.41 
Yes, I give part of the loan 2 7.41 14.82 
No, I use all on my own way 23 85.18 100 
Total 27 100   
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4.1.6. Descriptive Impact Assessment 
 
As Table 4.29 indicates majority of the borrowers i.e., 35.3% after they take loan from 
DECSI their power and status in their family has increased slightly, 30.9% increased very 
much and 29.4% reported that there is no change. Microfinance services lead to women 
empowerment by positively influencing women`s decision making power at household 
level and their overall socioeconomic status (Sara Noreen 2011). 
Table  4.29 Impact of loan in increasing power and status in their family. 
Impact of Loan on Power and 
Status in family Freq. Percent Cum. 
yes, very much 21 30.88 30.88 
yes, slightly 24 35.29 66.17 
No change 20 29.41 95.58 
Has rather decrease 2 2.94 98.52 
I just live alone 1 1.47 100 
Total 68 100   
 
But with regard to community 39.47% reported that there is no change in having respect 
and power, 34.21% of the sample clients have slight increase, 23.68% increased their 
power very much and 2.64% reported that they decrease their acceptance. Moreover, 
majority of the sample clients do not have a change in their acceptance and power at 
community level. 
 
 
Table 4.30 Power and acceptance with regard to community 
Impact of Loan on Power, Acceptance and 
Status in Community Freq. Percent Cum. 
Increased very much 18 23.68 23.68 
Slight increase 26 34.21 57.89 
No change 30 39.47 97.36 
Decreased 2 2.64 100 
Total 76 100   
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As can be seen from Table 4.31 below the borrowers were asked about the impact of the 
loan on their household`s life. Accordingly, the respondents reported as follows. 36% of 
the sample borrowers respond that it has very big positive impact (i.e., long term and 
permanent positive impact), 45%of them said it has good impact (mainly temporary 
benefit, but some permanent impact), 17% respond it has very small positive impact 
(small temporary benefit) and the remaining 2% react it has partly positive, partly 
negative (i.e., mixed with the overall impact being almost zero). 
Table 4.31 The impact of DECSI`s credit and saving services on the household`s life. 
Impact of DECSI Freq. Cum. 
Very big positive impact 36 36 
Good impact 45 81 
Very small  positive impact  17 98 
Partly positive, partly negative 2 100 
Total 100   
 
The Table 4.32 below indicates the reduction of the level of poverty over the last three 
years on household level showing 37% respond there is big reduction in the level of 
poverty, 58% (of course the majority of clients) said small reduction in level of poverty 
and the rest 5% said there is no change in their living standard. Generally we can 
conclude that financing the poor play a role in at least slight change in poverty reduction. 
 
Table 4.32 Impact on poverty reduction 
Level of poverty Freq. Cum. 
Big reduction in level of poverty 37 37 
Small reduction in level of poverty 58 95 
Remained the same 5 100 
Total 100   
 
 
 
55 
 
4.2. Descriptive Data on Expenditure 
 
4.2.1. Average Expenditure on different items of Borrowers 
 
Both an expenditure and consumption (they can be used interchangeably) of food and 
non-food is used for the analysis. When we say food it includes cereals, fruits and 
vegetables, pulses and oilseeds, spices and cooking items, animal products and drinks. 
Non-food consumption is categorized in to the following parts, the expenses includes on 
clothing, education, cleaning and personal care, firewood and fuel, housing and jewelry 
items and other expenses such as medical expenses, church contributions for the study 
month.  
The overall household monthly food consumption of the sample household clients is birr 
1090.68 for male headed households and birr 914.02 for female headed households and 
this indicated male borrowers spend more than their female counterparts which is 
significant at 10% level and with regard to non-food consumption for male headed 
households is birr 1261.76 and that of female headed households is birr 1254.11 which 
does not have a significant difference among the male and female households. Generally 
the total consumption of food and non-food items is birr 2352.44 for male headed 
households and birr 2168.13 for female headed households there is as such a significant 
difference. The per capita expenditure for male headed households is birr 190.72 and that 
of female headed households is birr 196.6. From the data the share of non-food 
consumption is higher than the food consumption i.e., the ratio of food consumption of 
male borrowers to female borrowers with reference to their total expenditure is 46.36% 
and 42.16% respectively and that of non-food consumption of male and female clients is 
53.64% and 57.84% respectively. The overall average amount of per capita total 
expenditure of food and non-food is birr 190.72 and birr 196.6 for male household 
headed and female household headed respectively (see Table 4.33). 
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    Table 4.33 Expenditure on food and non-food items 
 
Type of Expenditure 
 
Household t-test 
(probability) Male Headed Female Headed 
Food Consumption 1090.68 914.0165 0.0989* 
Education 176.15 145.993 0.2644 
Personal care 424.47 415.47 0.9217 
Utilities 139.94 174.92 0.1310 
Durables 246.20 298.17 0.7500 
Other Expenses 275 219.57 0.2125 
Total non-food expenditure 1261.76 1254.11 0.9748 
Total Expenditure 2352.44 2168.13 0.5430 
Per capita Expenditure 190.72 196.6 0.7685 
*Significant at 10% level 
 
 
4.2.2. Expenditure of Treated and Control 
 
The Table below (4.34) indicates the household food consumption for treated is birr 
964.49 and for control is birr 697.48 where there is a significant difference at 1% level 
those who participate in microfinance spends more this is due to the fact that their income 
has increased. Similarly, the total non-food consumption of treated is birr 1256.30 and 
control is birr 856.37 the same is true for the increased amount of expenditure on non-
food items which have a significant difference at 10% level. Moreover when we see the 
total food and non-food expenditure of participants and non-participants is birr 2220.79 
and birr 1553.85 respectively with a significant level of 5%. With regard to per capita 
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income, total food and non-food expenditure of treated and control is birr 194.92 and birr 
180.28 respectively where there is no a significant difference among them. 
    Table 4.34 Expenditure of Treated and Control 
 
Type of Expenditure 
 
Household t-test 
(probability) Borrowers Non-borrowers 
Food Consumption 964.4918 697.4802 0.0043*** 
Education 154.6093 133.564 0.4179 
Personal care 418.0379 294.9907 0.1210 
Utilities 164.9236 143.243 0.3056 
Durables 283.3204 106.2035 0.1915 
Other Expenses 235.4071 178.3721 0.1472 
Total non-food 
expenditure 
1256.298 856.37 0.0515* 
Total Expenditure 2220.79 1553.85 0.0103** 
Per capita Expenditure 194.9217 180.28 0.4190 
   ***=significant at 1% level;**=significant at5% level;*=significant at 10% level 
 
4.3. Empirical Analysis 
4.3.1. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
 
Propensity score is the probability of treatment on treated (participants) or control (non-
participants) based on observed characteristics. The propensity score gives a room to 
analyze an observational or non-randomized so as to match the particular characteristics 
of controlled and treated subjects.   
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The basic idea behind propensity score matching (PSM) is to match each participant with 
an identical non-participant and then measure the average difference in the outcome 
variable between participants and non-participants. The first step in PSM is to determine 
the propensity score and satisfy the balancing property. 
Matching is a technique which deals with selection bias that estimates the unobserved 
outcome participants from those who are not participants in the program of course who 
have similar characteristics on their observable characteristics. The objective of matching 
is finding a closest comparison group among program participants and non-participants. 
Closeness is measured interns of the observable characteristics. 
I. Obtaining the Propensity Score 
 
 As Zaid (2008) has indicated estimation of ATT using PSM involves three basic steps. 
• Computing the propensity score. 
• Matching on the basis of propensity score and, 
• Obtaining the treatment effect as a difference of the mean outcomes of 
participants and non-participants from the matched observations. 
According to Ravallion (2001), the main steps in matching based on propensity scores are 
as follows: 
Step1.To have a representative sample survey of eligible non-participants and pooling the 
two together. Data on participants and non-participants should be collected from the same 
questionnaire, same interviewer, same training, and same survey period and so on. 
Step2. Pool the two samples and estimate a logit or probit model of program participation 
as a function of all the variables in the data that are likely to determine participation. 
Step3. Create the predicted values of the probability of participation for each participant 
and non-participant. 
Step4. Some of the non-participant sample may have to be excluded at the outset because 
they have a propensity score that is outside the range (typically too low) found for the 
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treatment sample. The range of propensity scores estimated for the treatment group 
should correspond closely to the non-participants. 
Step5. Matching observations based on their propensity score. Here observations in the 
treatment sample are matched with observation in the control sample with the closest 
propensity score. How close should the propensity score depend on the type of matching 
preferred as described below. 
Step6. Calculate the mean value of the outcome of the treated and control units once 
matching is executed. The difference is the estimate of the gain due to the program for 
that observation. 
Step7. Finally, averaging the mean of the individual effects and obtaining the overall 
average treatment effect on the treated. 
There are four propensity score methods to match the observations. These are 
stratification matching, nearest neighbor matching, radius matching, and Kernel 
matching. Zaid (2008) has defined these methods as follows. 
Stratification (interval) matching: in this method the dataset is divided into intervals with 
each interval having on average the same propensity score. Treated and control units 
within that interval of propensity score will be placed under one block and the mean 
difference of the outcome between the treated and control units will provide the treatment 
effect for that block. The average difference of all blocks will finally provide the ATT for 
the entire sample. However, blocks without treated or control observations will not be 
considered for computing the ATT. 
 
Nearest neighbor matching: in this matching method the treated observation is matched 
with a control observation that has the closest propensity score. Hence, for each treated 
unit there is a nearest neighbor of control unit in terms of its value of propensity score. 
There is a possibility that a control unit can be a nearest neighbor for more than one 
treated observation. After matching each treatment unit with a control unit, the mean 
difference in outcome is calculated and obtains the ATT for the whole sample in the 
study.  
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Radius matching: in this method each treated observation is matched with those control 
observations that fall within a pre-specified neighborhood (radius) of the propensity score 
of the treated observation. The size of the radius plays a vital role in this method. If it is 
set to be very small some treated observations may not be considered because they may 
not found a match from the control units. But better matches may be produced with 
smaller sizes of the radius. 
 
Kernel matching: considers all treated and control observations. All treated observations 
are matched with a weighted average of all control observations with weights that are 
inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of treated and 
controls. 
 
 
II. Impact Analysis 
 
4.4. Results and Findings 
 
The first step before computing average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is to 
estimate the propensity score for each observation. As stated earlier, it measures the 
probability of being participated in microfinance given a set of control variables. In this 
case, the control variables are those household characteristics not affected by program 
participation. Hence, the probability is estimated using the control variables. 
Accordingly, the propensity score for treated and control observations is estimated using 
the probit model as can be seen in the Table below. Some of the control variables are 
individually statistically significant and the whole model is significant as well as 
indicated by the chi-square test and the R2 (measurement of goodness of fit) 
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Table 4.1a Probit Estimation of the Propensity Score   
Control Variables Coeff. Std.err Z P>\Z| 
Age 0.0180984 0.0089196 2.03 0.042** 
Female HH 0.2150785 0.2421108 0.89 0.374 
Tot HH mem 0.1246252 0.0579256 2.15 0.031** 
Literacy 0.0380716 0.2373256 0.16 0.873 
Constant -0.8220066 0.5490815 -1.50 0.134 
 
No. of Observations = 182 
LR chi2(4) =               12.22 
Prob>chi2 =               0.0158** 
Pseudo R2 =              0.0614 
 
After running the probit model it was found out that the balancing condition is satisfied 
and hence we can proceed to the next steps of estimating the treatment effect. 
 
Following the computation of propensity score, we have to check whether the balancing 
condition is satisfied or not before matching the observations according to their scores. In 
our case the balancing property is satisfied. Thus, if the balancing condition is satisfied, 
observations having the same propensity score will have the same distribution of 
observable and unobservable characteristics irrespective of treatment. This implies that 
with the help of the propensity score, treatment is virtually randomized and, as a result, 
treatment and control group members will on average be observationally identical 
(Becker and Ichino, 2002). 
 
 In the model, we have dependent variable the participation dummy, i.e., Ti=1 for the 
treated and 0 to the control groups. the control variables which are included in the model 
are ‘age’ of the borrower, ‘femaleHH’  a dummy variable indicating if the borrower is 
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female household head or otherwise, ‘totHHmem’ indicating the total number of persons 
in the household, ‘literacy’ which is dummy variable showing if the borrower is literate 
assigned 1 otherwise 0. 
 
The basic idea behind propensity score matching (PSM) is to match each participant with 
an identical non-participant and then measure the average difference in the outcome 
variable between the participants and non-participants.  
 
Table 4.1b below shows the estimated results of ATT for household expenditures. The 
household expenditure consists of different categories like food expenditure, educational 
expenditure, personal care, utilities, durables and jewelry, and other expenditure. Other 
expenditure items include medicine, payment for house servants, as well as social or 
religious contributions for the study month September 2006. The summation of all the 
expenditure categories will give total expenditure for the study month. ATT estimates are 
provided for food expenditure, non-food expenditure and per capita expenditure. 
 
ATTs for the above mentioned expenditure categories are estimated through matching of 
treated and control observations. In all the matching methods, the number of observations 
for the treated is 139 and that of control is 41 except for the nearest neighbor matching 
which contains 33. ATTs of the individual expenditure categories like food consumption 
and expenditure, expenditure on personal care expenditure on durables, and per capita 
expenditure (only the stratified method is insignificant in the per capita expenditure). On 
top of this, expenditure on utilities (Electricity, Water, and Telephone), educational 
expenditure and other expenditure (only the ATT in nearest neighbor is significant) do 
not have significant ATTs. Even though the three individual items which are categorized 
under non-food expenditure have insignificant ATTs, the ATT of total food and non-food 
expenditure is quite significant.  Surprisingly ATT is significant on durables and jewelry. 
We can safely conclude that DECSI`s loan had a significant impact on the borrowers. 
Household income has increased as a result they have purchased household furniture like 
table and similar items, bed, TV and tape recorder as well as jewelry including gold and 
silver.   
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Figuratively, those who participated in microfinance have gained in food consumption 
expenditure ranging between birr 260.77 and birr 290.08. The gain of expenditure for 
personal care on average ranges from birr 142.16 to birr 190.97. ATT estimates are 
statistically significant on expenditure of durables and jewelry and the clients of DECSI 
enjoyed an average gain ranging between birr 179.42 and birr 211.61 resulting from the 
loan. 
In general, the ATT estimates of the total non-food expenditure are quite significant and 
the average gain obtained ranges from birr 424.03 to birr 453.53. Moreover, DECSI`s 
clients obtain an average gain on total food and non-food expenditure that ranges 
between birr 684.81 and birr 736.52 which is statistically highly significant. The ATT 
estimate of per capita total expenditure is statistically significant except for the stratified 
method and the average gain ranges from birr 38.34 to birr 47.98. 
To sum up, the analytical findings indicate that the loans taken from DECSI has 
improved the clients` wellbeing in their living standard of course that can be expressed in 
terms of the expenditure on food and non-food which includes expenditure on personal 
care, durables and jewelry. The income of the clients has increases due to the fact that 
beyond their food consumption they possess durable goods like household equipment and 
jewelry such as gold and silver. However, we did not find significant difference between 
treated and control groups for total expenditure on education, utilities and other expenses 
like social contributions except that in only one method (Nearest Neighbor) is significant. 
The increment of income is not only at household level but also total per capita of 
individual household members. For detailed results, see the tables below. 
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Table 4.1b Impact Evaluation Estimates on Food and Non-food Consumption 
1. Food Expenditure 
Matching method Treated Control ATT Std.err t-value 
Nearest Neighbor 139 33 290.086 102.134 2.840*** 
Stratified 139 41 260.779 74.061 3.521*** 
Radius 139 41 282.986 78.689 3.596*** 
Kernel 139 41 270.767 73.581 3.680*** 
 
2. Educational Expenditure 
Matching method Treated Control ATT Std.err t-value 
Nearest Neighbor 139 33 3.094 45.345 0.068 
Stratified 139 41 26.754 27.880 0.960 
Radius 139 41 7.870 30.324 0.260 
Kernel 139 41 6.157 29.077 0.212 
 
3.  Personal care Expenditure 
Matching method Treated Control ATT Std.err t-value 
Nearest Neighbor 139 33 120.923 88.300 1.369 
Stratified 139 41 142.166 63.538 2.238** 
Radius 139 41 190.972 67.561 2.827*** 
Kernel 139 41 180.585 49.907 3.618*** 
**=significant at 5% level *** significant at 1% level 
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4. Expenditure on Utilities 
Matching method Treated Control ATT Std.err t-value 
Nearest Neighbor 139 33 5.125 32.717 0.157 
Stratified 139 41 20.155 20.753 0.971 
Radius 139 41 19.932 22.434 0.888 
Kernel 139 41 18.502 27.040 0.684 
 
5. Expenditure on Durables 
Matching method Treated Control ATT Std.err t-value 
Nearest Neighbor 139 33 211.610 90.981 2.326** 
Stratified 139 41 179.425 89.106 2.014** 
Radius 139 41 181.468 92.222 1.968** 
Kernel 139 41 182.563 73.142 2.496** 
 
 
6. Other Expenditures 
Matching method Treated Control ATT Std.err t-value 
Nearest Neighbor 139 33 87.065 46.686 1.865* 
Stratified 139 41 55.534 34.851 1.593 
Radius 139 41 53.292 37.387 1.425 
Kernel 139 41 50.404 39.133 1.288 
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7. Total Non-food Expenditure 
Matching method Treated Control ATT Std.err t-value 
Nearest Neighbor 139 33 427.817 188.207 2.273** 
Stratified 139 41 424.033 149.919 2.828*** 
Radius 139 41 453.534 157.668 2.877*** 
Kernel 139 41 438.212 168.745 2.597*** 
 
8. Total Expenditure(food +non-food) 
Matching method Treated Control ATT Std.err t-value 
Nearest Neighbor 139 33 717.903 252.545 2.843*** 
Stratified 139 41 684.813 196.837 3.479*** 
Radius 139 41 736.520 208.016 3.541*** 
Kernel 139 41 708.978 160.492 4.418*** 
 
 
 
9. Per capita Expenditure 
Matching method Treated Control ATT Std.err t-value 
Nearest Neighbor 139 33 47.987 26.379 1.819* 
Stratified 139 41 19.638 17.178 1.143 
Radius 139 41 38.340 18.534 2.069** 
Kernel 139 41 41.137 15.665 2.727*** 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATION 
5.1. Conclusions 
 
In this study an attempt was made to assess the loan repayment performance of DECSI`s 
women borrowers in comparing with their male counterparts and to evaluate the impact 
of microcredit on the economic and living conditions of the borrowers. Moreover both 
descriptive statistics and econometrics analysis were employed to assess the above 
mentioned facts. 
  
The descriptive statistics shows that majority of the sample borrowers are female which 
is higher than their male counterparts and this is in line with the mix of regular group 
loan clients in urban areas. This shows that more is done on the microfinance institution 
towards women empowerment. Regarding literacy almost half of the sample borrowers 
cannot read and write and this will have an effect on their business activity. For sure 
literate borrowers can make their business activities in a better way than those who are 
illiterate. Formal training was given that helps the borrowers undertake the kind of 
business they are involved. Accordingly 86% has received the formal training which is 
given by DECSI and the remaining by other organs like Micro and Small Enterprise 
Promotion Agency, Bureau of Agriculture and others. DECSI has trained the clients and 
deliver the loan so this helps the borrowers to perform their business wisely starting 
where to invest the loan so that they will make profit so that they will repay their loans 
timely. Therefore, training has a positive impact on repayment performance.   
 
Loan amount is crucial that affects the repayment performance of borrowers i.e., both 
under financing and over financing have problems. The loan amount should be delivered 
based on the kind of business they are involved. In our study the minimum amount of 
loan was birr 200 and maximum birr 2500 on average the minimum is birr 193.81 and the 
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maximum birr 3148.44 during different loan periods. In the study 58% (of which 4% 
reported that the loan amount is more than enough and 54% the loan amount is good 
enough) therefore about 58% of sample borrowers respond the loan given by DECSI is 
sufficient to make their business. Despite they are more in number female borrowers take 
loans on average birr 1412 which is lower than their male counterparts amounting birr 
1995. This is due to the fact that they are involved in small business like shop, local 
drinks (Tella, Tej). On top of this, they do not want to take risks. However the profit they 
make is also smaller than their male counterparts but with regard to loss female 
borrowers make smaller loss even there was a loan period that do not make any loss (see 
Table 4.10). Therefore 100% of the borrowers have settled their first loan timely 
according to their contractual agreement made with the lending institution. 
 
The clients of DECSI have made their repayment performance from the benefit they 
obtain fully (70%). The loan frequency of borrowers ranges from 2-14 meaning there are 
borrowers who have taken 14 times and this frequency implies that they are performing 
well because unless they repay their current loan they will not get the subsequent loan 
according to DECSI`s lending criteria. The incentives for taking the subsequent loan (as 
can be seen in Table 4.20) is due to its positive impact i.e., 80% of them is the result of 
the previous loan was good so they want to take again, 14% of them also due to the 
improvement of their living condition. Generally we can conclude that the loan is used 
for productive purposes and the borrowers are paying their loan on time from the benefit 
they get without any difference in sex not as stated in Hypothesis 1 female borrowers are 
more trust worthy in credit repayment than their male counterparts. Hence, microfinance 
clients in this study area are credit worthy and they fulfill their repayment obligation on 
time.  
 
With regard to Hypothesis 2, DECSI`s credit service has a positive impact on income, 
food expenditure and empowerment of women both at household as well as at 
community level. Generally, there is an improvement in the borrowers well being. In this 
study majority of the women borrowers make financial and business decisions by 
themselves hence, they use the loan by themselves. However, microcredit loans have a 
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positive impact on women decision making at household level only on those female 
clients who utilize their loans for themselves. 
 
As the title of the thesis indicates the small amount of loans taken from DECSI by the 
borrowers have larger impact on their living standard. 
 
5.2. Recommendations 
 
Based on the findings obtained from descriptive and econometrics analysis of the study, 
the following recommendations are derived. 
 
1. Microfinance institutions should be strengthened and support the poor women and 
should provide trainings to the borrowers before they deliver the loan because this 
is likely to enable them to have some level of managerial ability in their business. 
 
2. As the policy of the government supports to empower women, the microfinance 
institutions has to do more to rise the amount of loan which is the economic 
determinant so that empowerment will be beyond at household or community 
level. 
 
3. A microfinance institution has to enable the women borrowers to invest in other 
profitable business activities that encourage them to develop their new 
entrepreneurial skills rather than continuing the existing business where they 
make it traditionally.   
 
4. The finding of this study indicates that most respondents of DECSI do not like 
group lending. Hence, the institution might need to reassess this group lending 
methodology so that the members of the group who perform well should not be 
affected by those who do not perform to be served in the next loan period. 
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